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(D. C. No. 2-11-cv-03537) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 11, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 19, 2012) 
 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Elizabeth Caserta appeals from the District Court’s September 29, 2011, order 
granting defendant GEICO General Insurance Company’s Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
: 
I.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 
218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008); DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(noting that a district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo).  
“Under Rule 12(c), judgment will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes 
that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  In reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(c) motion, we must view the facts 
presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 221 (quoting Jablonski v. Pan 
Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
II. 
 On June 14, 2011, Caserta filed a First Amended Complaint against GEICO for 
breach of contract and bad faith.  It alleged the following facts: 
Background 
 Caserta and Edward Carcarey, her boyfriend, were walking along the shoulder of 
Route 422 in Lower Pottsgrove Township, Pennsylvania, on the night of September 21, 
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2007, when an unidentified car hit them both.  The impact propelled Edward Carcarey 
through the air and into a gully below the highway, where he died of his injuries.  Caserta 
suffered minor injuries and subsequent emotional distress. 
 At the time of the accident, Suzanne Carcarey, Edward Carcarey’s mother, had an 
automobile insurance policy with GEICO that included uninsured motorist coverage.  
The relevant section of the policy defines “Insured” as: 
  (a) you; 
  (b) a household member; 
  (c) any other person while occupying an owned auto; 
 (d) any person who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury 
sustained by an insured under (a), (b), and (c) above. 
 
Edward Carcarey, as a household member, was therefore an insured under his mother’s 
policy.   
 Caserta gave GEICO notice that she was asserting a claim for her own injuries 
under subsection (d) of the policy, but GEICO refused to pay.  Caserta then filed her 
complaint against GEICO.  On July 6, 2011, GEICO moved for judgment on the 
pleadings.  On September 29, the District Court granted the motion and entered judgment 
in favor of GEICO.  Caserta appealed. 
III. 
 Substantive Pennsylvania law governs this diversity action.  State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710, 713 (3d Cir. 2000).  While the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court is the authoritative source for Pennsylvania law, we may consider intermediate 
state court decisions, as well as federal appeals and district court decisions interpreting 
Discussion 
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Pennsylvania law, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not passed on an issue.  Id.; 
Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Caserta contends that her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is 
covered by the GEICO policy of Edward’s mother, Suzanne Carcarey, because Caserta is 
“entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury sustained by an insured [Edward].”  
Caserta argues that because Edward Carcarey was an insured and was entitled to recover 
damages by reason of his bodily harm, she should be entitled to recover also by reason of 
of her injuries in the same event, including her emotional injury caused by witnessing 
Edward’s death. 
To establish a bystander claim for emotional injury under Pennsylvania law, a 
plaintiff must prove that (1) she was located near the scene of the accident or negligent 
act, (2) the shock she experienced was a direct result of the sensory and contemporaneous 
observance of the accident, and (3) she was closely related to the victim of the accident. 
Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 949 (Pa. 2011); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 685 
(Pa. 1979).  Only the third requirement is at issue here.1
Caserta argues that whether a boyfriend and girlfriend are “closely related” for 
purposes of a bystander claim is an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania and that “it 
is not inconceivable” that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would include her 
relationship to Edward Carcarey within the definition of “closely related.”  The 
    
                                              
1 In this discussion of liability to by-standers for emotional injury, we are not deciding 
whether such a claim by Caserta is covered under the GEICO policy at issue here.  It is 
simply because we find that there would be no by-stander liability in the situation here, 
that we do not go on to determine whether the policy would cover it in this instance.  
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court first expanded emotional injury liability to include 
bystanders in Sinn v. Burd and suggested in its opinion that only a parent, child, or spouse 
should be allowed to recover as a bystander. Sinn, 404 A.2d at 677 n.6; see Blanyar v. 
Pagnotti Enters., Inc., 679 A.2d 790, 791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting that the Sinn 
Court suggested only the “victim’s immediate family” were “closely related”).   
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not revisited the scope of the third 
requirement since Sinn, and lower Pennsylvania courts have been hesitant to expand the 
class of individuals who can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See 
Toney v. Chester Cnty. Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 91 (Pa. 2011) (equally divided court) (noting 
that the Court must draw lines to “prevent unlimited liability to an unlimited number of 
plaintiffs, notwithstanding the commission of negligent acts”); Armstrong v. Paoli Mem’l 
Hosp., 633 A.2d 605, 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (noting that “Pennsylvania has 
consistently refused” to expand liability beyond “close family members” who actually 
witness the accident).  The Pennsylvania Superior Courts have recognized as “closely 
related” only plaintiffs who were related to the victim by blood or marriage.  See e.g. 
Turner v. Med. Ctr., Beaver, PA, Inc., 686 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding 
that sisters were “closely related” under Sinn); Krysmalski v. Tarasovich, 622 A.2d 298 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (allowing a mother to recover after witnessing injury to her 
children); Neff v. Lasso, 555 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (allowing a wife to recover 
after witnessing injury to her husband); see also Blanyar, 679 A.2d 790 (finding that the 
plaintiff could not recover because he and the victim were only cousins).  
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Pennsylvania courts have not found a relationship like Caserta’s – that between a 
boyfriend and girlfriend – to be “closely related” for purposes of a bystander claim.  
Caserta points to two trial-level courts that allowed a plaintiff who was not related to the 
victim by blood or marriage to recover. See Black v. Wehrer, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 313 (Pa. 
Ct. Com. Pl. 1995) (allowing fiancé to recover for emotional distress caused by 
witnessing death of betrothed); Kratzer v. Unger, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 771 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1981) (allowing foster parent to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing 
death of foster child).  However, these isolated decisions are not binding in Pennsylvania 
courts.  Moreover, the cases cited by Caserta are distinguishable because her alleged 
relationship with Edward Carcarey does not rise to the same level of formality as an 
engagement or a foster parent-child relationship. 
Our task, as a federal court sitting in diversity, is “to apply state law and not to 
form it.” Coviello, 233 F.3d at 716 (3d Cir. 2000).  For purposes of bystander liability 
under Pennsylvania law, Caserta is not “closely related” to Edward Carcarey, her 
boyfriend.  As a result, we conclude that her claim fails as a matter of law, and she cannot 
recover under Suzanne Carcarey’s GEICO policy.   
Caserta also argues that because she suffered physical injury in this accident in 
which Edward Carcarey was an insured, she can recover for her emotional injury, i.e., she 
herself has coverage as an “insured.”  This argument fails because, under the clear 
language of definitions (a), (b), and (c) of the policy, she is not an insured. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
Conclusion 
